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Abstract
In this article, we outline how evolutionary economic geography (EEG)
explains peripheral economic development by comparing two peripheries over
extended time periods. This comparison involves critically appraising EEG’s
capacity to account for peripheral evolution. For geographical, historical, and
political reasons, peripheries lack resources that lead to path creation and
renewal. The hyper-peripheral regions of the Pilbara in north-west Australia
and of Buryatia in south-east Russia provide excellent comparative case studies
for understanding how peripheral regional development evolves in ways contingent upon time, state institutions, natural resource endowments, and
region/firm dynamics. Our analysis shows that EEG is well equipped to deal
with historical factors and capitalist economies but it struggles to reconcile
these regions’ resilience and ability to sustain both Indigenous and nonIndigenous socio-economies. Development in these regions over extended
periods of time invites questions about whether it is appropriate to apply EEG
and its constituent parts: path creation, renewal, and exhaustion; regional
resilience; and institutional thinness and thickness. In addressing those questions, we show that EEG can incorporate temporal development, stretching
over long periods and economic analysis. We also critique the extent to which
EEG can be used to consider how state activities influence path creation and
renewal, the importance of extra-regional contexts, and heterodox and Indigenous perspectives.
KEYWORDS

Buryatia, Russia, evolutionary economic geography, Indigenous development, long history,
periphery, Pilbara, Australia

1 | INTRODUCTION
Core-periphery relationships are significant for understanding regional development and evolution. Peripheries

typically contain resource deficiencies when compared
with their cores, resulting in economic development that
is both sluggish and volatile (Tonts et al., 2013) and,
despite sharing some characteristics, is not uniform.
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Peripheral variation can provide insights into regional
evolution in peripheries and more generally.
Evolutionary economic geography (EEG) is a temporal approach to economic analysis of the development of
regions, considering time, opportunity spaces, and endogenous and exogenous forces (Boschma & Frenken, 2006,
2011; Grillitsch et al., 2018). Regional evolution, a manifestation of how regions utilise these opportunity spaces,
results from embedded processes of path creation,
exhaustion, extension, and renewal within material historical
development
(Boschma,
2015;
Hassink
et al., 2019). Contemporary regional economies are
influenced by their past (Henning, 2019), inviting historical analysis stretching back in time. There are nearinfinite prior iterations of regional socio-economies, each
forming the preconditions for subsequent development.
In response, to explain peripheral regional evolution,
we consider two peripheral regions. Specifically, we interrogate the historical and evolutionary processes that
ingrain peripherality by applying the principles of EEG to
two hyper-peripheral regions and, in doing so, expose
some of EEG’s shortcomings. Following “core-centric”
perspectives, peripheries have limited capacity to generate and retain value within a region (Boschma &
Frenken, 2006), meaning they are particularly vulnerable
to lock-in and path dependence (Isaksen, 2015),
diminishing their resilience (Martin, 2010; Webber
et al., 2018). Applying EEG in this context confirms that
it enables consideration of economic and temporal factors, but practitioners are less well equipped to consider
socio-economic and Indigenous perspectives. On that
basis, we aim to guide EEG’s theoretical trajectory by
examining if applying heterodox perspectives will foster a
more pluralistic economic geography (Martin, 2021),
build on EEG’s strengths and highlight its deficiencies.
EEG engages capitalist, firm-centric economic analysis (Boschma & Frenken, 2011; Peck, 2013a) to generate a
dynamic understanding of economic growth and value
capture within regions. Indeed, Yeung (2021) calls for
regional studies scholars to understand changing variety
in firms and sectors, and new pathways and specialisations. Definition of regional success in EEG draw
upon the processes, presumptions, and priorities of “corecentric” capitalist development; this is not the only
measure of socio-economic success, and, for example,
substantivist (Peck, 2013a) and Indigenous economic
logics (tebrakunna country et al., 2019) can also be
applied. Furthermore, the very notion of peripherality is
problematic from these perspectives because these
regions are not peripheral to Indigenous peoples’ enduring socio-economies, an insight reinforcing the point that
peripherality reflects power structures. Coupled with heterodox economic approaches, reimagining the “core”
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Key insights
Evolutionary economic geography provides a
lens through which peripheral regional development can be understood, not least because
peripheries evolve despite lacking many
resources that correlate with positive regional
outcomes. We show that deficiencies in institutional thickness and regional resources make
extra‐regional actors such as states and firms disproportionately important in embedding peripheral development. This inflated importance
reflects and entrenches unequal power‐relations
between the dominant economic ideology of the
core and these hyper‐peripheral regions.

invites an expanded conceptualisation of regional development and resilience.
Here, we compare two hyper-peripheral regions, the
Pilbara and Buryatia, alike in being vast, with huge
expanses of unsettled land where no economic activity
takes place and located thousands of kilometres from
national capitals. Each region was colonised, leading to an
influx of population and economic activity, but each
retains little regional value adding. Their peripherality is
underscored by a lack primary cities and by the presence
of secondary cities and hinterlands that exacerbate economic disadvantage (Scholvin et al., 2020). Given these
shared characteristics and starting points, evolutionary processes would suggest similar but not identical outcomes;
however, empirically the regions retain many differences.
The contributions made are threefold. First, we
advance understandings of EEG by examining peripheral
regions over “long history.” Second, we deepen understandings of how, in peripheries, extra-regional actors are
fundamental to development. Third, by applying EEG to
these hyper-peripheries, we “stress test” EEG’s analytical
limits, demonstrating its strong capacity to portray temporally sensitive accounts of capitalist regional development and its limitations—including incorporating
presumptions about the core into peripheral regions. We
examine the literature to show how and why peripherality shapes evolution. We then consider the role of
time in EEG before introducing substantivist and Indigenous analytical frames. Thereafter, we place the Pilbara’s
and Buryatia’s development in their historical, economic,
and evolutionary contexts. Subsequently, we draw out
key differences in both “inputs” and “outputs” that
explain their evolution, demonstrating how EEG can
consider both peripherality and resilience differently.
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2 | PERIPHERAL EVOLUTION
AND H ETERODOX APPROACHES
O V ER “LO NG TIME ”
EEG is an approach, distinct from institutional and neoclassical approaches, which scholars use to consider economic geography as an evolutionary phenomenon
(Boschma & Frenken, 2006). EEG examines how and to
what extent forms of economic activity embed in regions
and, inversely, how dependent or “locked in” regions
become to their paths (Martin & Sunley, 2006). EEG has
led to explanations of how—shaped by agents’ choices
over time—regions harness human, natural, and entrepreneurial/combinative assets within their borders
(Isaksen, 2015). What constitutes an asset, however, is
subjective. For instance, peripheral regions regularly have
an abundance of resources including uncommoditised
wilderness, whose value may lie in its lack of realisation
of market value (Clapp et al., 2016).
At any time, regional assets can be harnessed to
create income-generating activities through path creation and path renewal (Grillitsch et al., 2018; Hassink
et al., 2019; Trippl et al., 2018). Explanations about
these processes, however, reflect power relations and
the priorities of those who set economic and policy
agendas. While EEG can be used to identify regional
assets, its application does not explain why resource
endowments exist, revealing a methodologically salient
question about when to commence analysis. We argue
for “long history,” dating back to pre-colonisation and
the very first economic activities. Long history accounts
for regional development as an adaptive and iterative
process based on reactions to historical circumstances.
Indeed, when considering peripheral regions whose
thinness and institutional deficiencies are embedded
regional characteristics, long histories have additional
explanatory power. If researchers are properly to interrogate time, it is necessary to extend the scrutiny a
long way. One of EEG’s foundational insights is that
regional development is a temporal process reflected in
many measures and metaphors deployed in EEG,
among them the idea that paths, growth and lock-in
are inherently temporal. Henning (2019) has described
how regions’ economic geographies develop with relation to their histories; indeed, regional evolution is
actively produced over and through time. Here, we
consider economic development of regions rather than
specific production processes and follow Barratt and
Ellem’s (2019) theorisation that global production networks and regional development are produced over
time. EEG enables the explanatory power of “longitudinal patterns of regional economic evolution” to be revealed (Henning, 2019, p. 602).

3

One such pattern, regional resilience is “the capacity
of a regional or local economy to withstand, recover
from, and reorganize in the face [of] … shocks to its
developmental growth path” (Webber et al., 2018, p. 358).
Shocks are adverse circumstances or perturbations that
dislodge a system from its existing path (Martin &
Sunley, 2015). Core-periphery analysis also allows for better understandings of “shocks” as we describe below, as
shocks can be brought about by the policy choices of
those in economic “cores,” reflecting and entrenching
core-periphery dynamics. There are debates about
whether to measure resilience as the ability to bounce
back to pre-shock paths, absorb a shock within a current
structure or adapt and deal with change (Martin &
Sunley, 2015; Webber et al., 2018). Either way, these definitions overlook regional contexts and the fact that
peripheral regions face persistently hostile circumstances.
In response, we suggest that resilience is shown in
regions where socio-economies endure when facing persistent hostile circumstances and that peripheries face
ongoing structural challenges, meaning the ability to
endure these conditions can be considered an extension
of “evolutionary resilience” (Martin & Sunley, 2015).
One way to understand regional development capacity is to consider institutional thickness which, while difficult to quantify, is dynamic and embedded in regional
histories (Amin & Thrift, 1994; Zukauskaite et al., 2017).
Resources are attracted to thick regions, a process which
compounds iteratively, entrenching processes of peripheralisation and suggesting “long histories” are fundamental to understanding contemporary regional paths,
thickness, and development.
Regional thinness—lack of thickness—and susceptibility to lock-in correlate with peripherality
(Isaksen, 2015; MacKinnon, 2008; Martin & Sunley, 2006;
Trippl et al., 2018). Regions’ peripheral status is based on
their geographical or organisational distance from
“cores” (Martinus et al., 2020). Because of resource
endowment or processes of peripheralisation, peripheral
regions generally lack sufficient populations, knowledge,
and institutions to generate institutional thickness or create paths (Isaksen & Trippl, 2017; Trippl et al., 2020).
Thus, few value-adding activities become embedded,
resulting in economies dominated by primary resource
extraction (Isaksen, 2015), which enriches the core, a
result of economic and social choices, because “resource
[exploitation] is grounded in different social relations
that make nature a resource” (Irarrazaval, 2020, p. 1).
Understanding the evolution of peripheral economies
remains a challenge (Trippl et al., 2020). Peripheral
regions strain EEG because new industrial activities
rarely emerge by branching from prior paths but rather
need to be constructed from the ground up (Lagendijk &
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Lorentzen, 2007). However, this ground-up construction
is difficult to reconcile with foundational ideas in EEG
that regional preconditions shape subsequent activity
(Isaksen & Trippl, 2017). The application of EEG’s principles to peripheral regional development helps explain
why and how economic development in peripheries is
different from that in core regions and, we argue, helps
clarify how peripherality and uneven development are
entrenched over time.
We turn to the role of extra-regional actors in shaping
evolution of peripheries. Actors shape the form of economic development in their preferred image (Jolly
et al., 2020). Extra-regional actors retain disproportionate
control over how regions evolve, suggesting power and
politics play a role more significant than firms in shaping
peripheral socio-economies. EEG’s prioritisation of intraover extra-regional links (Yeung, 2021) becomes problematic when analysing peripheries because of the disproportionate role of extra regional actors.
Extra-regional actors also reveal a scalar problem in
EEG because both states and firms are categorised as
extra-regional actors. They are simultaneously
“headquartered” outside a region while having activities
and agents embedded within it. For example, BHP is
headquartered in Melbourne, Australia, but has mines
and infrastructure fixed in the Pilbara. While we refer to
the states and firms as extra-regional actors, we acknowledge that this nomenclature is problematic because these
actors are simultaneously in and out of region.
Those using EEG adopt the assumptions embedded in
capitalist economic development (Boschma & Frenken,
2006). However, socio-economic practices prevail that do
not submit to universal market rationalism (Block, 2001),
which leaves analytical space to challenge some presumptions in EEG and consider heterodox economic
approaches to economic development (Peck, 2013b).
Indigenous perspectives on economic development
incorporate varied beliefs and spirituality (tebrakunna
country et al., 2019), including connections to the natural
environment. Nature is not a resource to be commoditised but a fundamental part of individuals and society. In Australian Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
societies, this is Country—based on deep connections to
land, water, and sky and a fundamental part of life and
way of life (Smyth, 1994). Similarly, in shamanistic practices and beliefs held by Indigenous Buryat peoples, land,
and environment are divine and fundamental, and
humans are part of nature (Boldonova, 2016).
In EEG, regional development is defined in ways not
wholly compatible with perspectives that valorise Indigenous ownership and custodianship of land based on connection to that land, knowledge, and relationships (Clapp
et al., 2016; tebrakunna country et al., 2019). Prioritising
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Indigenous principles has significant implications for
understanding and challenging peripherality. Indigenous
connections to and understandings of these regions are
not based on ideas of remoteness or deficit because the
land is fundamental and deified and thee regions are
innately “core.”
Colonised Indigenous development has involved
viewing Indigenous peoples as beneficiaries of capitalist
regional development (tebrakunna country et al., 2019).
However, there is an emerging literature which considers
Indigenous development as prioritising Indigenous
knowledge and relations with country (Clapp et al., 2016;
Pike et al., 2006; tebrakunna country et al., 2019). Indeed,
as Irarrazaval (2020, p. 1) points out, “natural resources
are not natural commodities but, rather, are socioecological constructions.” Moreover, Indigenous worldviews exist in stark contrast to ideas about regional
development in EEG, which ascribe value to expropriating commoditised resources rather than sustaining the
region itself. Taking to an extreme arguments provided
by Breul et al. (2021), the creation of new extractive paths
in peripheries, desirable in EEG, may be deleterious from
an Indigenous perspective.
Thus, peripheral economic evolution needs to be considered distinctly for three reasons. First, accounts in
EEG of regional success need to deal with enduring
adverse circumstances, meaning ideas about resilience
needs to be recalibrated. Second, peripheral regions’ thinness reveals the need for longer and deeper historical
analysis more broadly to fully explain regional development. Third, peripheral status itself reflects the power
and values of the core.

3 | CASE STUDIES
We adopt a qualitative, comparative case-study analysis,
engaging regional comparison over extended time
periods. We extend and critique EEG by selecting cases
empirically distinct from prior studies so we can pursue
theoretical advancement (Burawoy, 2009). Case study
research is appropriate because the context of the study is
integral to it. Comparing the Pilbara and Buryatia regions
by considering their nature, history, location, and relationships (Stake, 2000), it is possible to draw insight and
explain social phenomena (Creswell, 2013). Case study
research is also appropriate for considering how endogenous and exogenous forces shape regional economic evolution (Henning, 2019; Østergaard & Park, 2015). Data
are drawn from secondary material, and in accordance
with the authors’ institutional ethics processes, comparing the histories of each region from pre-colonial to contemporary economic arrangements.
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The Pilbara and Buryatia are selected based on their
distance from their cores, enduring Indigenous communities, and histories of colonisation and because their
regional development is fundamentally shaped by their
peripherality. Comparing them reveals insights about the
evolution of peripheral regions, about why they are distinct from “cores,” and about the applicability of EEG to
understanding these processes.
Considering “long history” invites questions about
data selection and focus. The qualitative nature of inquiry
and restrictions on word length here means we have chosen to focus on moments of transition between paths (following Barratt & Ellem, 2019). We guard against both the
post hoc fallacy and data inconsistencies (Henning, 2019)
by charting significant changes to intra-regional economic activity (primarily path creation and exhaustion)
and engaging in capitalist and heterodox explanations
(Peck, 2013a, 2013b; tebrakunna country et al., 2019).

3.1 | The Pilbara
The contemporary Pilbara economy is dominated by
resource extraction, primarily mining. The region covers
500,000 km2, with a permanent population of 61,440,
14% of whom identify as Indigenous (Pilbara Development Commission, 2019). Iron ore mining constitutes
over 70% of gross regional product, construction 12.5%,
and no other industry contributes more than 3%. The resident workforce is 29,000, while 35,000 engage in long
distance commuting arrangements (Department of Primary Industries and Regional Development, 2020; Pilbara Development Commission, 2019).
The Pilbara’s geology, including its iron ore, was
formed 3.5 billion years ago (Buick et al., 1995). Aboriginal peoples have inhabited this Country since the beginning of The Dreaming, with radio-carbon dating
confirming that this extends over 50,000 years (Ward
et al., 2017). Indigenous socio-economies were based
around hunter-gatherer practices and fire-stick farming
and seasonal movement, based on food and water availability (Wangka Maya Pilbara Aboriginal Language
Centre, 2021). The contemporary region has over
31 Aboriginal cultural groups (Mulvaney, 2009;
Olive, 2012; Peck, 2013a; Somerville et al., 2010).
Europeans violently colonised the Pilbara in the
1860s (Gregory & Paterson, 2015). A low-intensity sheepfarming path to service the Swan River Colony (later
Perth) was created and dominated the regional economy
for a century, degrading the environment to the extent
that the sheep population was deliberately reduced from
a peak of 1.8 million (Suijdendorp, 1980). Members of the
industry used Aboriginal stockmen’s knowledge and
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labour and systemically abused Aboriginal people
(Peck, 2013a; Scrimgeour, 2014). By the 1950s, the
region’s extreme “thinness” was evident, with the Indigenous population estimated as 2,900 and the European
population as 3,249 (Marshall, 1968).
That thinness did not prevent the creation of mining
paths, but it did shape their form. Iron ore was discovered in the Pilbara in the 1860s, but transport costs, a
lack of proximate coal and a subsequent export embargo
to curtail Japanese expansionism then precluded path
creation (Barratt & Ellem, 2019). The fact that the ore
remained unexploited is significant and highlights the
point that important sociopolitical and technological preconditions to path creation are created rather than
“received.” Mining paths were later created in the 1870s
with small scale and quickly exhausted extraction,
including mining by Aboriginal people (Holcombe, 2005;
Mulvaney, 2013). The Pilbara’s remoteness and near
complete lack of infrastructure made creating new paths
nearly impossible, reflecting a hyper-peripheral and limited opportunity space.
Once regulatory barriers were withdrawn by the
Australian Government in 1960, four joint venture firms
that were extra-regional actors imported into the region
finance, people, and knowledge to create the open-cut
mining path (Dufty, 1984). Ore production grew rapidly,
from 0 to 18 million tons between 1967 and 1974
(Lee, 2015). The regional economy became locked into an
extractive path, with much of the value generated
enriching extra-regional capital and providing taxation
revenue to governments seated outside the region.
The West Australian Government sought to influence
regional development by setting the terms upon which
minerals were exploited (Dufty, 1984). Seeking to thicken
the region but by no means to make it thick, the government negotiated the construction of company towns,
increasing the permanent non-Indigenous population
(Horsley, 2013; Thompson, 1981). It also sought to
increase value capture in the region, incentivising locating value-adding activities such as beneficiation, but this
did not become an enduring element of the Pilbara’s economic landscape (Dufty, 1984; McIlwraith, 1988).
Workers organised into militant unions that exploited
mining capital’s vulnerability to industrial unrest
(Ellem, 2017; Vassiley, 2018). As regional denizens,
workers captured a larger share of regional value
(Dufty, 1984; Wilson, 2013). Aboriginal people were
excluded from company towns and mining jobs, denying
them access to the value created by mining (Ellem, 2017;
Holcombe, 2005).
Decreased global demand for ore in the late 1970s
and 1980s, coupled with the creation of iron ore paths on
other continents, forced changes in the Pilbara’s mining
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networks (Wilson, 2013). This external shock threatened
regional resilience and showed the extent of lock-in. In
response, capital reasserted managerial prerogative,
leveraging changing state employment policies
(Lee, 2015). These changes reflect a neoliberalisation of
the Pilbara’s labour force and society (Barratt &
Ellem, 2019; Ellem, 2013). Many techniques deployed to
de-collectivise the workforce originated in the
United States, effectively deploying extra-regional knowledge into the region (Ellem, 2015).
State policy reinforced the renewal of the extractive
path along neoliberal lines (Ellem, 2017). Fly-in fly-out
(FIFO) protocols were introduced, such that workers
work and sleep at the site of production for an extended
period, before a non-work period at “home” in other
places (Storey, 2001). FIFO work protocols allow greater
value to be created in a region, reducing mine construction costs and making extraction more commercially viable (Storey, 2001). The protocols are hard to explain
using EEG, because workers are both intra- and extraregional actors, making it difficult to categorise their
value creation and value extraction using regional
borders.
Into the 21st century, neoliberalisation in effect
increased the peripherality of the Pilbara’s economy and
reduced the ability of those (permanently) embedded in
the region to shape regional development. High ore
prices led to record revenues, new mines, and increased
production from 160Mt in 2001/2002 to 794Mt in
2018/2010 (Department of Industry and Resources, 2002;
Department of Mines, Industry Regulation and
Safety, 2019). FIFO workers residing in other regions and
overseas spent their wages away from the region. Indeed,
while the Pilbara’s iron became valorised and the region
became central to global iron and steel production networks (Barratt & Ellem, 2019), little investment was left
behind, entrenching institutional thinness and peripherality. It is the nature of the valorisation that contributes to the reinforcement of regional peripherality vis-àvis various cores (politically in Canberra, economically in
China).
Little value from the mining boom was retained
in the region, to the dissatisfaction of denizens (Barratt
& Ellem, 2019). Meanwhile, regional lock-in was
entrenched by barriers to development such as low population retention, accessibility, land availability, housing
affordability, lack of technology and tech firms, and
volatility in extractive market conditions (Shire of
Ashburton, 2018).
The extension of the extractive path has sometimes
brought Aboriginal peoples and mining companies into
conflict. Under the doctrine of Native Title, traditional
owners’ land rights were recognised (Sutton, 1996).
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Indigenous organisations became financial beneficiaries
of mining but “the relative economic status of Indigenous people residing adjacent to major long-life mines
is similar to that of Indigenous people elsewhere in
regional
and
remote
Australia”
(Taylor
&
Scambary, 2005, p. 1). Mining companies also sought to
ensure their social licence to operate using charitable
activities and Indigenous Employment targets. These
relations have become controversial after Rio Tinto, in
compliance with state regulation, destroyed ancient
sites in the Juukan Gorge (Toscano & Hastie, 2020) and
FMG, the third largest mining company in the region,
legally but unsuccessfully challenged a local Land
Council’s ability to exercise exclusive native title over
the land (Sargent, 2020). These disputes demonstrate
tensions between capitalist path extension in peripheries on one hand and Indigenous understandings and
priorities on the other.

3.2 | Buryatia
The Russian Federation consists of eight districts, the
easternmost of which is Far Eastern District. The south
westernmost federal subject of that district is the Republic of Buryatia (Buryatia), home to one of the largest
Indigenous populations in Russia east of the Ural Mountains (The Republic of Buryatia, 2020b). Buryatia covers
351,300 km2 and has a population of over 900,000 people,
approximately 31% of whom are Indigenous people (The
Republic of Buryatia, 2020a).
In Buryatia, industrial production accounts for 24% of
gross regional product, commerce 16%, transport and
communication 14%, and agriculture (mainly meat and
poultry) approximately 10% (Federation Council of the
Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, 2020; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 2018).
Industrial production focuses on machine building, metal
processing, power generation, non-ferrous metallurgy,
food and fuel industries, forestry, wood processing, and
pulp-and-paper industries, which account for over 95% of
gross industrial production (FCFA, 2020), reflecting
greater diversity than the Pilbara’s near mono-economy.
A handful of extraction companies extract coal, uranium,
jade, and gold and are either subsidiaries of umbrella
corporations in central Russia nor owned by state-led
corporations, which again shows the difficulty of
characterising firms, states, and state-owned firms as
extra- or intra-regional actors. The same applies to the
largest industrial producers in the region, including
machine building that supports the state-owned Russian
Railways, steel works, aviation industry, the defence
industry, shipbuilding, and others. Most machine
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building and maintenance are done for the federal government. For example, the aviation plant is a subsidiary
of JSC Russian Helicopters headquartered in Moscow,
which in itself is part of state-owned Rostec corporation
(Vertolety Rossii, 2020). Finally, several wood processing
organisations include paper and pulp production
(Bazarov,
2018;
Gazeta
Nomer
Odin,
2019;
Tsybenov, 2018). Value is therefore extracted by extraregional actors.
Buryatia is a hyper-periphery because of its institutional and geographical distance from Russia’s core. Its
economy accounts for less than 0.5% of Russia’s GDP.
The contribution to GDP is relatively smaller than the
Pilbara because there are low levels of natural resource
exploitation. There is also net negative migration, with
3,000 people leaving the region for better economic
opportunities in the core each year (Ochirova, 2018).
These trend require examination; how do we explain
these regional differences using EEG?
Buryatia’s industrial mix and level of value-added
activity are explained by the region’s history, consistent
with adopting a “long history” lens. Manufacturing was
introduced and supported by the Tsarist and then the
Soviet central state, and this path extends into the postSoviet era, emphasising the enduring importance of
extra-regional actors in peripheral evolution, since paths
created under past political regimes indeed survived
these regimes.
The territory that comprises contemporary Buryatia
belongs to the northernmost Mongolian ethnos (Khamag
Mongol, a predecessor to the Mongol Empire) that
resided around Lake Baikal, Siberia, and the Far East
(Bold, 2001; Boronoyeva, 2006; Krader, 1954). Indigenous
Buryat worldviews are based in ecological traditions,
where humans are part of nature and nature is deified
(Kuryshova & Kuryshov, 2019). Buryat people historically
follow shamanist beliefs that are nature-centred and
uphold the divinity and spiritualism of the four elements—air, fire, water, and earth (Boldonova, 2016).
Thus, many forests, groves, and water locations were and
still are considered sacred. For example, tree cutting was
uncommon and only done with great care and
necessity—Buryats used fallen trees and branches as firewood. Hunting and fishing remain subject to traditional
practices (Kuryshova & Kuryshov, 2019).
Prior to colonisation, Buryats organised as nomadic
and semi-nomadic pastoral tribes, the harsh climate necessitating movement to sustain livestock (Krader, 1954).
Thus, the pre-colonial Buryat economy was self-sufficient
and self-regulating, reliant on pastoralism, hunting and
gathering, or trading Siberian furs such as sable and fox in
exchange for Mongolian and Chinese silver and tea
(Sablin, 2017). This description is not intended to
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romanticise Indigenous Buryat life—which was subject to
many challenges, including harsh climate and continuous
threats of invasion from hostile neighbours. Rather, it
provides a counter-narrative of regional development
reflecting priorities opposing the form of economic development deemed optimal by proponents of EEG.
Buryatia’s colonisation began in the 17th century
with the eastward movement of Russian Cossacks.
Lacking state resources, Tsarist Russia did not attempt to
change established ways of life for regional denizens.
Nomadic and semi-nomadic socio-economic paths
endured until the second wave of colonisation, when
“staroobryadtsi” (Old Believers) were exiled or chose to
settle in what is now Buryatia (UNESCO, 2008;
Vasiljeava, 2010). Since the 1760s, Buryatia has been populated by different groups, including various tribes of
Indigenous Buryats, Cossacks, runaway peasants escaping private estate owners, state peasants who were free
citizens paying tax to the state to access imperial lands
they tended, men of service, retired soldiers, criminals,
and Old Believers, all with their own priorities for
regional development (Sablin, 2017; Zhukovskaya, 1995).
State policy, specifically the Russian-Qing agreement,
limited transborder movements by Buryats, extinguishing
trading paths. Extra-regional domestic colonisers were
granted ownership of the most desirable lands, effectively
exhausting economic activity reliant on seasonal movements (Sablin, 2017). Documented land ownership was
supported by the Tsarist government between 1896 and
1917, marginalising the Indigenous population, and land
was seized for private transfer or state control, which
could then be rented back from the state (Sablin, 2017;
Zhalsanova, 2008). In contrast with the Pilbara, ethnic
frictions were negligible. Rather, the creation of a sedentary farming path resulting from the import of extraregional people, technology, and institutions led to
contention because of land allocation (Boronoyeva,
2006). By 1916, most people in the region were engaged
in livestock, wheat, rye, barley, oats, hemp, flax, and
tobacco farming. The value created stayed in the region
and fed the growing population (Kalmina, 2011).
Dominant paths endured, with centrally supported
crop farming and (increasingly marginalised) animal
husbandry leading to mutual discontent between sedentary farmers and nomads (Sablin, 2017). The cropfarming path endorsed by the Tsarist government was
entrenched by laws supporting new forms of land use
and economic activity and harnessing importation of
newcomers’ extra-regional knowledge to facilitate a particular form of regional development (Khaptaev, 1964,
pp. 45–47).
In the 18th century, resource extraction commenced,
and domestic migrants mined lead and silver
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(Buraeva, 2005). By the start of the 20th century, gold
mining was more valuable than all other mineral extraction combined (Sablin, 2017). Because of climate, institutional thinness, and the peripherality of the region, large
extraction facilities remained uneconomic, mirroring in
some ways patterns in 19th century Pilbara. Most extraction was done by denizen entrepreneurs and artisans,
and almost all value generated remained in the region
(Kalmina, 2011).
Transbaikalia, the region surrounding Lake Baikal,
including Buryatia, is peripheral to Moscow and St
Petersburg. However, Transbaikalia’s location was of
strategic importance to the central state, allowing control
of Siberia and the Far East (including Alaska until 1867)
and enabling trade with East Asian nations and the
United States. To ensure control and legitimacy, the state
prioritised Buryatia’s modernisation (Dondokov, 2018).
Built between 1891 and 1916, the Trans-Siberian Railway
and accompanying telegraphic communication facilitated
that process (Sablin, 2017). The railway brought increased
trade and resource extraction by providing a cheap, fast,
and reliable connection between the core and the periphery. Like the Pilbara, the region’s economy produced raw
materials with very little intra-regional value adding.
Furthermore, the railway effectively thinned the region
by exposing regional industries to competition from
newly connected western Russia, decreasing value adding
activities in Buryatia and precipitating the closure of an
iron ore processing facility (Khaptaev, 1964).
The Russian Revolution in 1917 markedly changed
state priorities. For Buryatia, it resulted in the formation
of the Buryat-Mongolian Autonomous Soviet Socialist
Republic. In the 1920s and 1930s, agriculture and industry were collectivised. From an institutionally thin
periphery solely dependent on agriculture, a Soviet version of “path renewal” produced an agrarian-industrial
region (Tsybenov, 2018). This form of regional development is antithetical to evolution because such processes
were imposed by a powerful central state. However, by
EEG’s measures, the region did engage in path renewal
because, in 1923, 17 enterprises employed 854 people
and, by 1937, 140 large and medium-sized industrial
enterprises, including glass manufacture and locomotive
repair, employed approximately 17,000 workers and
1,523 engineers and technicians. Simultaneously, collectivised agriculture reduced the livestock population and
closed crop farms, replacing them with large, capitalintensive collective farms. By 1937, 92% of all farming
was collectivised (Tsybenov, 2018). After the Second
World War, the planned economy further renewed these
paths and created machine building, electric power engineering, coal, mining, forestry and woodworking, light
and industrial food producing paths (Tsybenov, 2018).
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In part, industrial path creation and renewal happened because of the rise of Japanese militarism (predating analogous attitudes in Australia) and strained
relations between the USSR and China. These factors led
the state to prioritise industrial thickening in Buryatia for
geopolitical rather than economic reasons because of its
strategic importance (Dondokov, 2018). Both waves of
industrialisation thickened the region, a trend in contrast
with neoliberal priorities in Australia, where the markets
and thinness dictate the economic development of the
region.
The post-Soviet transition from planned to market
economics led to a creeping thinness and relative decline
in regional economic performance. In 1996, industrial
production was 45%, and agriculture was 46% of 1990
levels, and the number of livestock halved
(Bazarov, 2018; Tsybenov, 2018). Instead, personal farming activities emerged, avoiding market economics
completely (Tsybenov, 2018). Workers either left the
region or engaged in small businesses in commerce
(Peng, 2001). This shift evidences heterodox approaches
to regional development and shows how, in peripheries,
denizens’ wellbeing relates strongly to state interventions
(or indeed abdications).
The positive dynamics of the Russian economy and
institutional developments in 2000s resulted in a considerable uplift in Buryatia’s socio-economic conditions.
Manufacturing endures, with vehicles and equipment
remaining the largest industry (37% of the total industrial
volume), followed by production and distribution of
electricity, gas and water (24%), mining (18%), and
food production, including drinks and tobacco (9%)
(Tsybenov, 2018). However, its economic performance
remains lower than that in the Pilbara and lags behind
that in other Russian regions. Unable to engage in the
large-scale exploitation of natural resources because of
the harsh climate and the lack of capital, Buryatia still
needs federal support (Dondokov, 2018).
Soviet policy towards ethnicities was aimed at internationalisation and the “friendship of nations.” It had
two pillars—unprecedented cultural development and
the equality of peoples through de-ethnicisation and
assimilation, at least at the level of rhetoric
(Boronoyeva, 2006). State policy prioritised inviting Buryat people into the ideology of the core, the effects of
which persist because ethnic Buryats and ethnic Russians
have relatively equal socio-economic outcomes
(Dondokov, 2018; Zhambalova, 2018).
As in the Pilbara, there remain tensions between capitalist and Indigenous priorities in Buryatia. Low percapita economic activity impedes sustainable economic
development as denizens engage in the destruction of
nature to sustain themselves. State attempts to protect the
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environment amidst limited economic development
remain problematic as attempts at sustainable forest
management and reductions in water, earth, and air pollution are seen to impede industrial development (Batuev
& Dugarova, 2013). Although there is a push to return to
traditional approaches, the lack of opportunities for
regional value capture that avoid the exploitation of natural resources, as in the Pilbara, entrenches contradictions
between worldviews.

4 | ANALYSIS
Comparisons of the Pilbara and Buryatia highlight interperipheral differences, primarily pinpointing the fact that
Buryatia captures a higher proportion of value from a
much smaller level of economic activity. These economic
outcomes result from state development priorities, the
importance of the region to the core and the role of time
in development. Forms of development are contested,
revealing the importance of actor power in shaping path
creation, renewal, and the form of economic
development.
The Pilbara’s and Buryatia’s economies are shaped by
their distances from established cores. Both regions demonstrate resilience in that despite market, competitive,
and environmental shocks, they have maintained levels
of economic activity that outperform the limitations of
their opportunity space. To explain those limitations in
opportunity spaces, it was necessary to chart their
regional development over time. The “long history”
approach has revealed insights that otherwise would be
subsumed as “context” rather than considering their formative role in the contemporary regions. While this history is not determinative of a perpetual peripherality—
indeed, regions can become “core” over time1—the
history of these regions helps explain why they have
remained peripheral.
Absent population density, innovation, and path creators, these regions fundamentally rely on extra-regional
actors and resources. However, that path creation and
renewal are viewed as beneficial is subjective, because
they are not necessarily beneficial to regional denizens2
(Breul et al., 2021). While extra-regional actors import
ideas, investment, and resources to facilitate path creation, regional dynamism as defined in EEG means that
these actors rarely maintain full commitment to the
regions. Storey’s (2001) explanation of “fly-over” dynamics shows that regions can create value but actors can
extract that value leaving little regional benefit.
Explanations in EEG of path creation are fundamentally attributed to capital; however, this underplays the
role that states play in shaping peripheral regional
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development. Buryatia developed because of the influx of
population, resources, investment, and knowledge facilitated by the state on the basis that the region had strategic importance to Tsarist Russia. While sustaining
Indigenous Buryat ways of life, with distance, lack of
transport, and limited state resources, the region
remained thin and under-developed in terms of the measures used in EEG. The Soviet government had different
development priorities, attempting to create a relative
equality between peoples while industrialising the region
through central subsidy. The era of shock therapy saw
these industries exposed to the forces of the market and
suffering from path exhaustion and the final transition to
a centralised control government has increased reliance
on natural resource extraction.
In the Pilbara, the state shaped the region differently
over time, which we divide into four periods. First, the
relevant government did not develop the region because
of lack of resources. Subsequently, non-exploitation of
ore was based on Australia’s foreign policy objectives.
Once the embargo was lifted, the state created policy and
set the terms of resource exploitation based on a company town model. Finally, the state facilitated resource
extraction using increasingly neoliberal methods, which
allowed extra-regional private capital to import capital,
expertise, infrastructure, and people to develop the region
on its own terms.
Analysing state policy by reference to EEG’s frame of
“thickening” is problematic. The processes by which
regions are “thickened” are not the processes of evolution
but interventionist state policy. Peripheral (and, extending this analysis, all) regions have value intertwined
with but separate from their economic activities. Governments colonised these regions to both control territory
and lay claim to the resources therein. However, states
are not always sufficiently powerful to fully enact their
agendas during periods when they, themselves, are
resource poor: in the 19th century in both cases and in
the immediate post-Soviet period in Buryatia. Indirectly,
these periods facilitated continued Indigenous socioeconomies. However, both the Australia Government’s
desire to export ore and the military and commercial
importance of Buryatia to western Russia created an
impetus to develop these regions along particular lines.
Core-periphery relations are not merely geographical.
Regional development is shaped by the economic processes examined using EEG and by power relations.
Peripheral economic evolution is shaped by the geographical, political, economic, and social relationships
with their cores, a relationship that extends beyond the
analytical limits of EEG. Prior to colonisation, these
regions were deemed undesirable, and states devoted
few resources to their “capture.” However, changing
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circumstances meant that the regions became increasingly connected to global economic activity. While Buryatia became significant by connecting western Russia
with East Asia and Pacific ports, the Pilbara’s economic
connectedness was to east Asian steel mills. State priorities have been particularly significant for economic development in peripheries and in maintaining their
peripherality. The extreme variation in the very nature of
the Russian/Soviet state(s), which governed Buryatia,
places in stark relief the importance of the state in shaping path development and the fundamental importance
of the state, and whatever form it takes, to evolution
more generally.
EEG helps to explain how, in these regions, institutional thinning became ingrained, reinforcing these
regions’ diminished ability to retain the value the regions
generated. However, EEG’s narrow focus on economic
value does not capture in entirety the socio-economic
processes that underpin life in these regions. Both regions
lack value-added economic activities, as neither region
can capture value in an effective manner. While mining
companies reinvest a tiny fraction of their revenues back
into the region, Aboriginal Land Councils are remunerated and the state supports social infrastructure to a
degree, the vast majority of the value created by mining
exits the region. In Buryatia, thinness means the region is
not able to generate value, relying on its strategic importance to Moscow for subsidies to sustain the local economy (Dondokov, 2018).
Our analysis provokes questions about what evolutionary analysis means for Indigenous peoples, revealing
a blind spot in EEG; its forms of analysis are based on
industrial and post-industrial accounts of market economics. Peripheral regional development, as measured
using EEG, is associated with institutional thinness, limited connectedness to knowledge centres and reliance of
extra-regional actors. These characteristics help explain
why resource extraction is fundamental to peripheral
economies, which also creates an inherent conflict
between capitalist economic development and Indigenous worldviews. The conflict is brought into sharper
focus by the fact that the landscape, of supreme value to
Indigenous peoples, is “harvested” or “mined” by firms
and removed from the region to create “market” value.
The form of economic activity in each region is also
the result of the relative power of actors with different
spatial visions. Indigenous peoples have had little say or
capacity to sustain Indigenous regional development
(tebrakunna country et al., 2019). If the creation of economic paths is a function of actors’ relative agency and
power, then the priorities of capitalist (and for a period
Soviet) cores have dominated; they have almost wholly
determined the form of regional development. The
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limited non-extractive economic opportunities afforded
to denizens of both regions mean there are few choices
available other than to engage in economic activities, creating a trade-off between dominant capitalist economics
and Indigenous forms of development. These two ancient
regions’ economic paths are fundamentally shaped by
core-periphery power dynamics, which is only partially
captured by EEG. Peripheral regional development is not
solely based on who creates paths, or indeed on what
terms they are created, but on political, cultural and
economic power struggles over the form of regional
development. The results of these power struggles are
fundamental to the development of the region, its
prosperity (and how that prosperity is allocated) and
resilience.

5 | CONCLUSION
The comparison of the empirical development of the
Pilbara and Buryatia reveals insights both into the
characteristics of peripheral regions and inter-periphery
differences. These inter-periphery differences—where the
Pilbara outperforms Buryatia by EEG’s measures, despite
being a thinner region—show how evolutionary
approaches must be sensitive to historical antecedents
over “long history.” The explanatory power of long history, as we have demonstrated, also suggests this methodology can be fruitfully deployed in other fields of study
and can help to expand EEG to more diverse and more
distant regions.
EEG is well equipped to be used by those wanting to
consider path creation, extension, and branching going
further back in time. Despite extreme thinness, the significance of peripheral regions for territorial or geopolitical
rather than economic reasons reveals why and, to a lesser
extent, how extra-regional actors, states, and firms shape
peripheral development. We agree with Yeung’s (2021)
critique of EEG for prioritising what happens within
regions to the exclusion of broader forces and assert that
the case of peripheral regions underscores this point.
EEG approaches to regional economic development do
not account for such factors. The forms of regional development in the Pilbara and Buryatia reflect the power
advantage and priorities of the core, which embed a compounding “peripherality” where economic priorities are
determined by the core, and frequently, they also deprioritise the Indigenous and denizen worldviews in which
these regions are seen as innately core.
The application of EEG to such disruptive cases
reveals the strengths and limitations of EEG. By engaging
“long history,” we show that economic evolution is
shaped by ancient and then colonial histories of these
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regions. Compounding or disrupting regional characteristics over time is more extreme in peripheries, as
sustained thinness, limited capacity for branching and
lock-in all are more likely to occur. Thus, peripheral evolution needs to be explained in reference to extraterritorial centres of power (and their own development
paths) have shaped the form of development.
Peripheral regional development is shaped by
power, location, and time. While location and time
remain fundamental to EEG, examining two hyperperipheries in their long histories reveals weaknesses in
EEG’s ability to support consideration of how and why
regions change under “external shocks.” The lack of
power held by Indigenous and non-Indigenous regional
denizens means that states which have both reflected
and pursued the priorities of the core have profoundly
shaped the terms on which firms develop regions.
Resulting regional characteristics have endured as both
regions have intensified production (with associated
environmental and social degradation) and created
value primarily captured by the core. Explaining
regional development using both core/periphery and
coloniser/colonised power structures shows that
regional development reflects the preferred spatial
visions of those who wield power. By comparing capitalist and Indigenous forms of development, we have
exemplified different approaches to socio-economic
activity within regions and shown how value is
ascribed. Presuppositions in EEG about path creation,
regional resilience, and regional thickness cannot fully
account for heterodox approaches. While this lack is a
strength of EEG when applied to connected regions of
the core where tools for path creation and renewal are
present, it creates a comparative weakness in this
domain. EEG struggles to reconcile that Indigenous
people have sustained their pre-colonial socioeconomies
and that colonisers have found value from extracting
resources from the landscape. Thus, power dynamics
and structures affect how regions develop over time
and they compound over long periods of time. By situating the economic development of the Pilbara and
Buryatia in these contexts and inviting alternative ways
to consider economic development, EEG offers an effective partial explanation of these processes. This article
invites conversation in EEG about what is counted, and
how, to better capture what regional development is.
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ENDN OTE S
1

For an unexpected example of this, see the example of Mauritius
becoming a hub in oil and gas production (Scholvin &
Breul, 2021).

2

For a stark example of this in the Pilbara, we can consider asbestos mining near Wittenoom, a path that resulted in many workers
losing their lives to mesothelioma (McCulloch, 2006).
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